UCL  IRIS
Institutional Research Information Service
UCL Logo
Please report any queries concerning the funding data grouped in the sections named "Externally Awarded" or "Internally Disbursed" (shown on the profile page) to your Research Finance Administrator. Your can find your Research Finance Administrator at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/finance/research/post_award/post_award_contacts.php by entering your department
Please report any queries concerning the student data shown on the profile page to:

Email: portico-services@ucl.ac.uk

Help Desk: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ras/portico/helpdesk
Publication Detail
Multi-keyword multi-click advertisement option contracts for sponsored search
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Publication Sub Type:
    Journal Article
  • Authors:
    Chen B, Wang J, Cox IJ, Kankanhalli MS
  • Publication date:
    01/01/2015
  • Journal:
    ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
  • Volume:
    7
  • Issue:
    1
  • Status:
    Published
  • Print ISSN:
    2157-6904
Abstract
Copyright © 2015 ACM.In sponsored search, advertisement (abbreviated ad) slots are usually sold by a search engine to an advertiser through an auction mechanism in which advertisers bid on keywords. In theory, auction mechanisms have many desirable economic properties. However, keyword auctions have a number of limitations including: the uncertainty in payment prices for advertisers; the volatility in the search engine's revenue; and the weak loyalty between advertiser and search engine. In this article, we propose a special ad option that alleviates these problems. In our proposal, an advertiser can purchase an option from a search engine in advance by paying an upfront fee, known as the option price. The advertiser then has the right, but no obligation, to purchase among the prespecified set of keywords at the fixed cost-per-clicks (CPCs) for a specified number of clicks in a specified period of time. The proposed option is closely related to a special exotic option in finance that contains multiple underlying assets (multi-keyword) and is also multi-exercisable (multi-click). This novel structure hasmany benefits: advertisers can have reduced uncertainty in advertising; the search engine can improve the advertisers' loyalty aswell as obtain a stable and increased expected revenue over time. Since the proposed ad option can be implemented in conjunction with the existing keyword auctions, the option price and corresponding fixed CPCs must be set such that there is no arbitrage between the two markets. Option pricing methods are discussed and our experimental results validate the development. Compared to keyword auctions, a search engine can have an increased expected revenue by selling an ad option.
Publication data is maintained in RPS. Visit https://rps.ucl.ac.uk
 More search options
There are no UCL People associated with this publication
University College London - Gower Street - London - WC1E 6BT Tel:+44 (0)20 7679 2000

© UCL 1999–2011

Search by