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Publication Detail
An Improved Differential Attack on Full GOST
  • Publication Type:
    Conference
  • Authors:
    Courtois N
  • Publisher:
    Springer
  • Publication date:
    01/03/2016
  • Pagination:
    282, 303
  • Published proceedings:
    The New Codebreakers, Essays Dedicated to David Kahn on the Occasion of His 85th Birthday
  • Editors:
    Naccache D,Ryan P,Quisquater JJ
  • ISBN-13:
    978-3-662-49301-4
  • Status:
    Published
  • Language:
    English
  • Keywords:
    Block ciphers, GOST, differential cryptanalysis, truncated differentials, guess-then-determine, Gaussian distribution, distinguisher attacks
Abstract
GOST 28147-89 is a well-known block cipher. Its large key size of 256 bits and incredibly low implementation cost make it a plausible alternative for AES-256 and triple DES. Until 2010 \despite considerable cryptanalytic efforts spent in the past 20 years", GOST was not broken see [30]. Accordingly, in 2010 GOST was submitted to ISO 18033 to become a worldwide industrial encryption standard. In paper we focus on the question of how far one can go in a dedicated Depth-First-Search approach with several stages of progressive guessing and filtering with successive distinguishers. We want to design and optimized guess-then-truncated differential attack on full 32-bit GOST and make as as efficient as we can. The main result of this paper is a single key attack against full 32-round 256-bit GOST with time complexity of 2^179 which is substantially faster than any other known single key attack on GOST
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