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Publication Detail
The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process: An Economic Perspective
  • Publication Type:
    Conference
  • Authors:
    Caulfield T, Ioannidis C, Pym D
  • Publisher:
    Springer International Publishing
  • Publication date:
    04/10/2017
  • Pagination:
    131, 150
  • Published proceedings:
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
  • Volume:
    10575 LNCS
  • ISBN-13:
    9783319687100
  • Status:
    Published
  • Name of conference:
    GameSec 2017, International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
  • Conference place:
    Vienna, Austria
  • Conference start date:
    23/10/2017
  • Conference finish date:
    25/10/2017
  • Print ISSN:
    0302-9743
Abstract
© 2017, Springer International Publishing AG. The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) is used by the government to decide whether to retain or disclose zero day vulnerabilities that the government possesses. There are costs and benefits to both actions: disclosing the vulnerability allows the vulnerability to be patched and systems to be made more secure, while retaining the vulnerability allows the government to conduct intelligence, offensive national security, and law enforcement activities. While redacted documents give some information about the organization of the VEP, very little is publicly known about the decision-making process itself, with most of the detail about the criteria used coming from a blog post by Michael Daniel, the former White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. Although the decision to disclose or retain a vulnerability is often considered a binary choice—to either disclose or retain—it should actually be seen as a decision about timing: to determine when to disclose. In this paper, we present a model that shows how the criteria could be combined to determine the optimal time for the government to disclose a vulnerability, with the aim of providing insight into how a more formal, repeatable decision-making process might be achieved. We look at how the recent case of the WannaCry malware, which made use of a leaked NSA zero day exploit, EternalBlue, can be interpreted using the model.
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