UCL  IRIS
Institutional Research Information Service
UCL Logo
Please report any queries concerning the funding data grouped in the sections named "Externally Awarded" or "Internally Disbursed" (shown on the profile page) to your Research Finance Administrator. Your can find your Research Finance Administrator at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/finance/research/rs-contacts.php by entering your department
Please report any queries concerning the student data shown on the profile page to:

Email: portico-services@ucl.ac.uk

Help Desk: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ras/portico/helpdesk
Publication Detail
Margin squeeze: an above-cost predatory pricing approach
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Authors:
    Gaudin G, Mantzari D
  • Publisher:
    OXFORD UNIV PRESS
  • Publication date:
    03/2016
  • Pagination:
    151, 179
  • Journal:
    Journal of Competition Law & Economics
  • Volume:
    12
  • Issue:
    1
  • Status:
    Published
  • Print ISSN:
    1744-6422
  • Language:
    English
  • Keywords:
    Social Sciences, Economics, Law, Business & Economics, Government & Law, K21, L12, L43, EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE, PROPERTY-RIGHTS, ANTITRUST, POLICY, ENTRY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURES, COMPETITION, INVESTMENT, INDUSTRY
  • Notes:
    © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false positives and false negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent U.S. and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.
Publication data is maintained in RPS. Visit https://rps.ucl.ac.uk
 More search options
UCL Researchers
Author
Faculty of Laws
University College London - Gower Street - London - WC1E 6BT Tel:+44 (0)20 7679 2000

© UCL 1999–2011

Search by