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Publication Detail
Emergence of Cooperation in the Prisoner’S Dilemma Driven by Conformity
  • Publication Type:
  • Authors:
    Javarone MA, Atzeni AE, Galam S
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  • Pagination:
    155, 163
  • Published proceedings:
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
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We study the relations between strategies in game theory and the conformity. The latter is a behavior deemed relevant in social psychology and, as shown in several works, it strongly influences many social dynamics. We consider a population of agents that evolves in accordance with a payoff matrix which embodies two main strategies: cooperation and defection. In particular, agents play a game (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma) by choosing between these two strategies, in order to increase their payoff, i.e., their gain. During the evolution of the system, agents can change strategy according to an update rule, i.e., they can play sometimes as cooperators and sometimes as defectors. Usually, rules to update the strategy are driven by the payoffs of the neighbors of each agent. For instance, an agent imitates its best neighbor, i.e., the one having the highest payoff among the other neighbors. In this context, ‘imitation’ means to adopt the strategy of another agent. In order to study if and how the emergence of cooperation can be affected by a social influence, we provide agents with two different behaviors, i.e., conformity and nonconformity, they use to select their strategy. Numerical simulations show that conformity strongly affects these dynamics, as cooperation emerges in the population, even under conditions of the games that usually lead, almost all agents, to play as defectors.
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