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Publication Detail
Distorções de incentivo ao desempenho e redução de motivação no serviço público federal no Brasil = Distortions of incentive to performance and reduction of motivation in the federal public service in Brazil
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Authors:
    Corrêa I, Camões M, Meyer-Sahling J, Mikkelsen K, Schuster C
  • Publisher:
    Escola Nacional de Administracao Publica (ENAP)
  • Publication date:
    2020
  • Pagination:
    476, 503
  • Journal:
    Revista do Serviço Público
  • Volume:
    71
  • Issue:
    3
  • Status:
    Published
  • Print ISSN:
    2357-8017
  • Language:
    Portuguese
  • Keywords:
    Incentivos, Remuneração, Motivação de servidores públicos, incentives, remuneration, motivation of public officials
  • Notes:
    This is an Open Access article published under a Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Abstract
No atual sistema de cargos e carreiras do Poder Executivo federal brasileiro, servidores públicos que não ocupam cargos de livre provimento têm duas maneiras preponderantes para alcançar um patamar salarial mais elevado: antiguidade ou aprovação em concurso público para uma carreira mais bem remunerada. Neste artigo, sugerimos que essas maneiras de ascensão afetam negativamente a motivação para o serviço público. Primeiro, elas transferem os incentivos dos servidores públicos em início de carreira de desempenho no trabalho para preparação para concursos de carreiras com salários mais elevados, e simultaneamente os privam de outras formas de ascensão quando nos estágios intermediários e avançados de suas carreiras. Segundo, elas geram desigualdade salarial entre carreiras, desmotivando servidores públicos com responsabilidades semelhantes em carreiras com remunerações inferiores. Dados de nosso survey com 2.800 servidores públicos de 14 instituições do Governo Federal oferecem indícios acerca da importância de reduzir essas distorções de incentivo. // In the current structure of careers in the Brazilian Federal Government, public officials who do not hold a DAS position have two predominant ways of reaching a higher salary level: years of service and passing a written examination for a higher paid public service career. We argue in this paper that these pathways affect in a negative way public service motivation. First, they shift incentives of early career public officials from job performance towards preparing for higher paid career exams, while depriving officials in middle and later stages of their careers of any advancement opportunities. They also cause salary inequity between careers, demotivating officials with similar responsibilities in lower paid careers. Through statistical analyses of data from an original survey with 2,800 public servants in 14 federal government institutions in Brazil, our findings point to the importance of reducing incentive distortions in Brazil’s public service.
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