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Publication Detail
Google Shopping and the As-Efficient-Competitor Test: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Publication Sub Type:
  • Authors:
    Mantzari D, Germain G
  • Publisher:
    Oxford University Press
  • Publication date:
  • Journal:
    Journal of European Competition Law and Practice
  • Status:
  • Print ISSN:
Key Points: • The ‘as-efficient-competitor’ principle and the ‘as-efficient-competitor’ test should not be conflated, as this can generate a very narrow perspective on the goals EU competition law does and should promote. • While the ‘as-efficient-competitor’ principle remains a fundamental aspect in Article 102 TFEU, the relevance and application of the ‘as-efficient-competitor’ test in price-based exclusionary conduct has diminished over the years. • The General Court in Google Shopping embraces a categorical distinction between price and non-price based exclusionary conduct and reserves any application of the ‘as- efficient-competitor’ test to the former category only. We argue that there might be scope to introduce an ‘as-efficient-competitor’ test as one of the tools for assessing effects in ‘self-preferencing’ cases.
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