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Publication Detail
Incentives in peer-to-peer and grid networking
  • Publication Type:
    Report
  • Authors:
    Ackemann T, Gold R, Mascolo C, Emmerich W
  • Publisher:
    UCL-CS
  • publication date:
    2002
  • Report number:
    02/24
  • Series name:
    Research Note
  • Notes:
    Imported via OAI, 7:29:00 20th Jul 2005
Abstract
Today, most peer-to-peer networks are based on the assumptionthat the participating nodes are cooperative. Thisworks if the nodes are indifferent or ignorant about the resourcesthey offer, but limits the usability of peer-to-peernetworks to very few scenarios. It specifically excludes theirusage in any non-cooperative peer-to-peer environment, beit Grid networks or mobile ad-hoc networks. By introducingsoft incentives to offer resources to other nodes, we seean overall performance gain in traditional file-sharing networks.We also see soft incentives promoting the convergenceof peer-to-peer and Grid networks, as they increasethe predictability of the participating nodes, and thereforethe reliability of the services provided by the system as awhole. Reliability is what is required by Grid networks, butmissing in peer-to-peer networks.
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