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Publication Detail
Investigating loan applicants' perceptions of alternative data items and the effect of incentives on disclosure
  • Publication Type:
  • Authors:
    Jennett C, Brostoff S, Malheiros M, Sasse MA
  • Publisher:
    British Computer Society
  • Publication date:
  • Published proceedings:
    Privacy and Usability Methods Pow-wow (PUMP) 2010: Proceedings
  • Series:
    Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)
  • Status:
  • Conference start date:
  • Conference finish date:
  • Language:
  • EISSN:
  • Keywords:
    Loans, Privacy, Incentives
  • Publisher URL:
  • Notes:
    © Jennett, C and Brostoff, S and Malheiros, M and Sasse, MA, 2010. The original version of this article will be published in the eWiC series at http://ewic.bcs.org/ The workshop Privacy and Usability Methods Pow-wow (PUMP) 2010 was held in conjunction with the British Conference on Human Computer Interaction (British HCI) 2010.
Lenders use information about loan applicants to predict whether a person is a good or bad credit risk; however borrowers express reservations about disclosing their personal information. In this paper we describe the design of a study in which we try to identify which data items have bigger privacy costs for individuals and whether it is possible to adjust lenders' data collection procedures in order to improve the privacy of the borrowers while maintaining or improving the accuracy of risk assessment methods. We aim to explore whether consumers could be equitably encouraged to give different information than they do presently, by offering incentives for disclosures. These incentives are: an uncertain long term financial gain; a certain short term financial gain. We also explore an inequitable manipulation using peer pressure. The advantages and disadvantages of this methodological approach are also discussed.
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