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Publication Detail
Security Evaluation of GOST 28147-89 In View Of International Standardisation
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Publication Sub Type:
    Article
  • Authors:
    COURTOIS N
  • Publisher:
    Taylor & Francis, Inc.
  • Publication date:
    2012
  • Place of publication:
    Bristol, PA, USA
  • Pagination:
    2, 13
  • Journal:
    Cryptologia
  • Volume:
    36
  • Issue:
    Issue 1
  • Editors:
    Bauer C
  • Status:
    Published
  • Country:
    US
  • Print ISSN:
    0161-1194
  • Language:
    English
  • Keywords:
    Block ciphers, Feistel schemes, key scheduling, self-similarity, reflection attacks, single-key attacks, algebraic attacks, algebraic complexity reduction, black-box reductions
Abstract
GOST 28147-89 is the Russian equivalent of 3DES and AES. In 2010 GOST was submitted to ISO 18033, to also become a worldwide indus- trial encryption standard. Until 2011 researchers agreed that: "despite considerable cryptanalytic e®orts spent in the past 20 years, GOST is still not broken". Then in 2011 an attack was found. In this short paper we describe another attack, to illustrate the fact that there are now attacks on GOST, which require much less memory, and doesn't even require the re°ection property to hold. More generally, our ambition is to do more than just to point out that a major encryption standard is °awed. We would like to present and suggest a new general paradigm for e®ective symmetric cryptanalysis of so called "Black-box Algebraic Complexity Reduction". This new paradigm builds on many already known attacks on symmetric ciphers, such as ¯xed point, slide, involution, cycling and other self-similarity attacks but the exact attacks we obtain, could never be developed previously, because only in the recent 5 years it became possible to show the existence of an appropriate last step for many such attacks, which is a low data complexity software algebraic attack.
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