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Publication Detail
Queues and Strategic Experimentation
  • Publication Type:
    Conference presentation
  • Authors:
    Cripps MW, Thomas CD
  • Date:
    2012
  • Name of Conference:
    World Congress of the Game Theory Society
  • Conference place:
    IStambul
  • Conference start date:
    01/07/2012
  • Conference finish date:
    01/07/2012
Abstract
We present a model of strategic experimentation in which each player's actions generate both payoff and information externalities for other players. A sequence of players arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. Players who decide to wait for service form a queue in the order of which they will be served. At each service opportunity, the number of players served follows a known geometric distribution in the good state, while no service ever occurs in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if players are served or if queuing players become too pessimistic to wait and quit the queue.
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