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Publication Detail
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long Run Relationships
  • Publication Type:
    Journal article
  • Publication Sub Type:
    Article
  • Authors:
    Cripps MW, Mailath GM, Samuelson L
  • Publisher:
    Elsevier
  • Publication date:
    01/05/2007
  • Pagination:
    287, 316
  • Journal:
    Journal of Economic Theory
  • Volume:
    134
  • Issue:
    1
  • Print ISSN:
    0022-0531
  • Keywords:
    reputation, imperfect monitoring, repeated games
Abstract
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407–432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely repeated games.
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